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NOTES
EQUITABLE DISCRETION TO DISMISS CONGRESSIONAL-PLAINTIFF
SUITS: A REASSESSMENT*
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit has devised a doctrine called equitable discre-
tion to screen congressional-plaintiff suits. The Author argues
that the doctrine should be abandoned. She proposes that the
courts be guided by existing standng principles in deciding
whether to hear these cases.
WHEN MEMBERS OF Congress sue members of the executive
branch or their own colleagues, they pose unique problems to
a system of separated powers. Such suits, once practically unheard
of, have become relatively common. The recent trend began in the
early 1970's, when congressmen sought to persuade the courts to
declare illegal various executive activities related to the Vietnam
War effort.' Since then, congressmen have brought suits to chal-
lenge a wide variety of governmental actions, including pocket ve-
toes,2 CIA spending,3 United States involvement in Nicaragua, 4
* I am very much indebted to Professor Jonathan L. Entin at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law for suggesting this topic to me and for his helpful comments on
every draft.
1. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (challenging
bombing and military involvement in Cambodia), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 963 (1974);
Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (challenging the continuing activities in
Indochina without a declaration of war or an explicit authorization by Congress); Drinan v.
Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1973) (same as Holtzman); Gravel v. Laird, 347 F.
Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972) (challenging operations in Vietnam without a congressional decla-
ration of war).
2. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
3. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
4. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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the assignment of committee seats in the House of Representa-
tives,5 the accuracy of the Congressional Record,6 and an assort-
ment of statutory enactments.7 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit has heard most of these
congressional-plaintiff cases.8
The problem the courts face when a congressman seeks their
aid in declaring invalid or enjoining some governmental action is
that in doing so they may encourage the circumvention of the ba-
sic constitutional requirements for the enactment and execution of
laws. A legislator, for example, might endeavor to persuade a
court to strike down as unconstitutional, rather than his colleagues
to amend or repeal, a statute that he dislikes. If the court com-
plies, it has enabled the legislator to by-pass the hurdles of bicam-
eralism and presentment,9 which are supposed to safeguard the
legislative process. 10 Similarly, a congressman's suit to compel the
proper execution of a statute resembles the exercise of a legislative
veto of a particularly troublesome kind, since it does not require
even unicameral backing, let alone presidential approval."
5. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
823 (1983).
6. Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
7. E.g., Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir.) (ascertainment clause and
delegation-doctrine challenge to the Federal Salary Act of 1967, 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-61
(1988)), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 491 (1988); Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836
F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2034 (1988) (appointments clause
challenge to the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221 et seq. (1988)); Moore v. United
States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1106 (1985) (origination clause challenge to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982); Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm.,
656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981) (appointments clause chal-
lenge to the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C §§ 221 et. seq. (1988)).
8. See supra notes 1-7.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § I (two houses of Congress); id. at § 7, cl. 2 (presentment of
bills to the President).
10. Thus, when Senator Riegle complained that the Federal Reserve Act procedures
for election of members of the Federal Open Market Committee deprived him of his right
to vote his advice and consent concerning the appointments, the court stated: "It would be
unwise to permit the federal courts to become a higher legislature where a congressman
who has failed to persuade his colleagues can always renew the battle." Riegle, 656 F.2d at
882. See infra text accompanying notes 35-57.
11. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)(invalidating, on separation-of-powers
grounds, the one-house legislative-veto provision in § 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 244(a)(1) (1988)); Bloch, Orphaned Rules in the Administra-
tive State: The Fairness Doctrine and Other Orphaned Progeny of Interactive Deregula-
tion, 76 GEo. L.J. 59, 115 (1987) (The effect of informal pressure on agencies by congress-
men seeking to retain a rule that the agency is ready to dispense with or modify "is not
substantially different from that of the formal legislative veto condemned in Chadha.").
1989-90] CONGRESSIONAL-PLAINTIFF SUITS 1077
The D.C. Circuit sought in the early cases to limit the access
of congressional plaintiffs to judicial relief through the use of ex-
isting doctrines derived from Article II11 In Mitchell v. Laird,12
for example, it dismissed under the political-question doctrine the
claim brought by thirteen congressmen against the President that
the United States military involvement in Indochina violated the
war powers clause. The Mitchell court reasoned that even if the
continued hostilities were illegal, the President had the duty to
end them only as quickly as other vital national interests would
permit.13 Whether the President was in fact attempting to end the
hostilities was a question, however, that the court deemed itself
incompetent to decide. 14
Other D.C. Circuit congressional-plaintiff cases turned on
standing. 15 The court developed the principle that only congress-
men who complained of action that constituted "a disenfranchise-
ment, a complete nullification or withdrawal of a voting opportu-
nity," based on "an objective standard in the Constitution," would
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of the standing analysis.16
Complaints of mere "diminution in a legislator's effectiveness,"' 7
through actions such as the denial of information or the failure to
execute a law, and which could be remedied through the legisla-
tive process, were deemed insufficient injury to confer standing.' 8
12. 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
13. Id. at 616.
14. Id. Other courts also used the political-question doctrine to dismiss challenges to
the Vietnam War. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 963 (1974); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1973); Gravel
v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972).
15. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (setting out a test for
congressional standing and finding that the plaintiffs satisfied that test), vacated on other
grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.) (dismissed for
lack of standing), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (same); Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (same); see also Public Citizen v. Sampson, 515 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (mem.)
(affirming without opinion the district court's dismissal for lack of standing), affig 379 F.
Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1974); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (reaching
the merits after determinng the congressional-plaintiff issue in favor of plaintiffs under the
doctrine of standing).
16. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 702. In Goldwater, the court conferred standing on con-
gressmen who "plead[ed] an objective standard in the Constitution as giving them a right
to vote on treaty termination," and who "allege[d] disenfranchisement in the context of a
specific measure, i.e., the proposed termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty" with Tai-
wan. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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In a 1981 article, Carl McGowan, then Chief Judge of the
D.C. Circuit, suggested a new approach.19 Arguing that none of
the existing doctrines adequately addressed the separation-of-pow-
ers concerns inherent in congressional-plaintiff suits, he proposed
instead that courts address these concerns separately from Article
III inquiries, in the exercise of their "discretion . . .to grant or to
withhold injunctive or declaratory relief."2 ° The key to exercising
this "equitable discretion" in a principled way was to deny relief
whenever a legislator "could get substantial relief from his fellow
legislators,"'" the same standard, that is, that had emerged from
the earlier cases decided under the standing doctrine.22 This stan-
dard, Chief Judge McGowan argued, would ensure the judicial
involvement necessary to the smooth functioning of the constitu-
tional system of government, as when an entire house of Congress
enlists the court's aid in resolving a dispute with the Executive. 3
Unless the courts could intervene in such a situation, Congress
would have to resort to obstructionist maneuvers, such as refusing
to vote appropriations, or else be left with no remedy at all.24
The equitable-discretion doctrine became part of the law of
the D.C. Circuit later that same year2" and it has been applied
many times since,26 but the Supreme Court has neither approved
nor disapproved it.27 Within a year of its adoption, the equitable
19. McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241
(1981).
20. Id. at 262; cf. Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine? 85 YALE L.J.
597, 617-22 (1976) (arguing that some political-question cases should have been dismissed
for want of equity and that separation-of-powers considerations could inform the equity
analysis); Note, Congressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1632
(1977) [hereinafter Congressional Note] (suggesting such an approach to individual con-
gressmen's statutory claims, but that the courts address individual congressmen's constitu-
tional claims under the political-question doctrine and reach the merits of suits brought by
Congress as a whole).
21. McGowan, supra note 19, at 263.
22. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
23. McGowan, supra note 19, at 263-64.
24. Id. at 264.
25. See Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
26. See Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 491
(1988); Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 108 S.Ct. 2034 (1988); Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Moore v.
United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1106 (1985); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1251 (1984); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 823 (1983).
27. Indeed, the Supreme Court has heard only three congressional-plaintiff cases in
1078 [Vol. 40:1075
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discretion doctrine had provoked vehement disapproval from one
member of the court 28 whose camp was soon joined by another. 29
That the time has arrived for re-examining equitable discretion in
the light of experience is evident from the two most recent appli-
cations of the doctrine, in which all members of the deciding
panels expressed their "concern" about it, but felt compelled to
continue to apply it until either the Supreme Court or the Circuit
en banc decides they should do otherwise.30
Part I of this Note critically plots the course of the equitable-
discretion doctrine from its first enthusiastic application to the
present mood of doubt.3" Part II discusses whether equitable dis-
cretion has changed the D.C. Circuit's analysis or merely con-
fused it.32 Part III shows the limited usefulness of equitable dis-
cretion and suggests that the courts deny standing to all
congressional plaintiffs. 3 Part IV analyzes equitable discretion in
the context of the classic Bickel-Gunther debate and concludes
that it is too unprincipled a device to be retained.'
I. THE CASES
The D.C. Circuit adopted equitable discretion as a means of
deciding when to reach the merits of congressional-plaintiff suits
in Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee. 5 Riegle involved
Senator Donald Riegle's challenge to the procedures in the Fed-
eral Reserve Act (FRA) for the selection of the five members of
recent years. None of these cases expressed any opinion about the lower court's analysis of
the congressional-plaintiff problem. See Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (D.C. Cir-
cuit's decision on the merits, which had conferred stahding on a group of congressional
plaintiffs, dismissed as moot, because the statute at issue had expired by its own terms
since the earlier decision); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (On direct appeal
from the D.C. District Court, the issue of the congressional plaintiffs' standing was not
addressed, because the private plaintiffs clearly qualified for standing.); Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (Without mentioning congressional standing, upon which the
D.C. Circuit had relied in reaching the merits, four justices voted to dismiss the congres-
sional-plaintiff suit as a political question and one concurred on grounds of ripeness.).
28. See Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1177-85 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork later
expressed his disapproval at greater length in Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41-71 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361
(1987).
29. See Moore, 733 F.2d at 956-65 (Scalia, J., concurring).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 162-74.
31. See infra notes 35-174 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 175-96 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 197-228 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 229-52 and accompanying text.
35. 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
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the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) whom the boards
of directors of the Federal Reserve Banks elect. The Senator from
Michigan complained that these five members were "Officers of
the United States" whose selection, like that of the other seven,
should conform with the Appointments Clause, and he alleged an
injury to "his constitutional right to vote in determining the advice
and consent of the Senate to [their] appointment."36
The D.C. Circuit, relying heavily on Chief Judge McGowan's
article," claimed that existing doctrines were incapable of resolv-
ing the separation-of-powers problems peculiar to congressional-
plaintiff suits. 8 The court said that its standing analysis, until
now its favorite means of dismissing these suits, had incorporated
contradictory principles and had led to doctrinal inconsistencies."
The court had developed in earlier cases a requirement that con-
gressional plaintiffs lack any form of relief from their fellow legis-
lators before it would grant them standing.40 Since private plain-
tiffs are entitled to their day in court regardless of whether
nonjudicial remedies are available to them,4 this requirement
contradicted other judicial statements that congressional plaintiffs
and private plaintiffs were to receive equal treatment in the stand-
ing analysis. The court also found that the collegial-remedy stan-
dard had been inconsistently applied, because standing had been
granted in at least two cases in which the Riegle court believed
that a collegial remedy did exist.4
The Riegle court felt that the other doctrines commonly used
to dispose of congressional-plaintiff suits, political question and
ripeness, were not "sufficiently catholic in formulation or flexible
in application to resolve the prudential issues arising in congres-
sional-plaintiff cases."4 The court did not mention, however, that
36. Id. at 877.
37. McGowan, supra note 19.
38. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 879-81.
39. Id. at 879-80.
40. The Riegle court found this collegial-remedy principle in, e.g., Harrington v.
Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 212-14 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (congressman denied standing to challenge
CIA practices, in part because his ability to cure the alleged injury by voting on future
legislative measures remained unimpaired). See Riegle, 656 F.2d at 877, 879-80.
41. Id. at 877-79.
42. Id. at 879-80 (citing Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (challenge to President's termination of a treaty with-
out seeking the advice and consent of the Senate), and Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (challenge to allegedly illegal pocket veto)).
43. Id. at 881.
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"prudential considerations" are one of the three inquiries that
make up political-question analysis."' Instead, it supported its re-
jection of the political-question doctrine as not sufficiently "flexi-
ble" by focusing on just one formulation of the doctrine: whether
the issue has been committed by the text of the Constitution to
one of the political branches. 5 The court also failed to mention
that "prudential considerations" motivated Justice Powell's vote in
Goldwater v. Carter to dismiss as not ripe the dispute in that case
between a few congressmen and the executive branch, where the
two branches had not reached a "constitutional impasse."46 Fi-
nally, the court ignored the prudential component of the standing
47
Dissatisfied nonetheless with existing doctrines as means of
resolving when to hear congressional-plaintiff suits, the Riegle
court announced its solution to be the adoption of a new doctrine
of "circumscribed equitable discretion," 48 that is, in McGowan's
formulation, the application of "the courts' traditional discretion
to grant or withhold equitable relief."' 49 The new standard would
lead to dismissal whenever, as in this case, a "[congressional]
plaintiff has standing but could get legislative redress and a simi-
lar action could be brought by a private plaintiff."50 The require-
ment of the availability of a private plaintiff was intended to pre-
vent "non-frivolous claims of unconstitutional action [from]
go[ing] unreviewed by a court," 51 but arguably this addition to
44. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring) (deriving a three-part
test from the various formulation of the doctrine listed in Baker v. Carr, 365 U.S. 186,
217 (1962)).
45. See Riegle, 656 F.2d at 880-81. But see Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998 (Powell, J:,
concurring) (The textual-commitment inquiry is but one of three inquiries subsumed into
the political-question doctrine. A court must also ask whether "resolution of the question
demand[s] that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise" and whether "prudential
considerations counsel against judicial intervention.").
46. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997.
47. The prudential component of the standing inquiry is discussed in Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
48. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 881.
49. McGowan, supra note 19, at 244.
50. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 882.
51. Id. This addition to the collegial-remedy test formulated by McGowan, supra
note 19, at 263, may also be explained as an attempt to justify reaching the merits in
Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Riegle court admitted that
Congress could have redressed Senator Edward Kennedy's complaint about a pocket veto
by reintroducing the legislation. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 880. McGowan thought it was an
"extremely close question" whether under his collegial-remedy test the court should have
decided Senator Kennedy's claim. McGowan, supra note 19, at 265; see also Barnes v.
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the test was mere dictum.52 The opinion focuses on the fact that
Senator Riegle could get relief by persuading his colleagues to
amend the FRA, rather than on whether private plaintiffs could
assert a similar claim. 58
The Riegle opinion is less than satisfactory. The court elimi-
nated from its standing inquiry the requirement that collegial
remedies be exhausted, because it disapproved the unequal treat-
ment of congressional and private plaintiffs.5 ' In its place, the
court substituted a separate hurdle, applicable only to congres-
sional plaintiffs, which demanded that they resort to the same
"self-help" 55 that had formerly been a prerequisite to standing.
Furthermore, the court added the new requirement that non-con-
gressional plaintiffs be unlikely to attain standing.56 And the court
did not question the results reached in any of its previous cases,57
or explain how the same standard recast as a separate hurdle
would lead to any less inconsistent results in the future.
Equitable discretion did not supplant all other doctrines and
become the only test for dismissal of congressional-plaintiff suits.
The next two such cases decided by the D.C. Circuit did not even
mention the new doctrine. Of the three claims brought by con-
gressmen and private plaintiffs in Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), 58 the court dismissed one under
the political-question doctrine, one under the ripeness doctrine,
and the third on the merits. In American Federation of Govern-
ment Employees v. Pierce,59 the complaint of a congressman and
private plaintiffs was heard and lost on the merits on the basis of
standing conferred on the congressman.
Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., dissenting) (noting that an equitable-
discretion doctrine based solely on the availability of a collegial remedy would heve barred
Senator Kennedy's suit), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
52. See Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211, 213 n.3, 214 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
109 S.Ct. 491 (1988); Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 565 & n.3
(D.C.Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2034 (1988); Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 544
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
53. See Riegle, 656 F.2d at 882.
54. Id. at 879.
55. McGowan, supra note 19, at 254.
56. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 881.
57. McGowan, supra note 19, at 265-66, on the other hand, questioned whether
under his standard the court should have reached the merits in Goldwater v. Carter, 617
F.2d 697 (D.C.Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), or Kennedy v. Samp-
son, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See supra note 51.
58. 675 F.2d 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
59. 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
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Metzenbaum involved a challenge by congressmen of both
houses, private organizations, states and state officials to the valid-
ity of legislation concerning the Alaska natural-gas pipeline and of
a FERC order issued pursuant to the legislation. 0 The plaintiffs
alleged: (1) that the legislation had been passed in violation of
previously enacted parliamentary rules contained in the Alaskan
Natural Gas Transportation Act, (2) that its substance violated
the fifth amendment rights of natural-gas consumers to reasonable
rates, and (3)"that the FERC order had been improperly issued
without the notice and comment procedures required by the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA)61
The court did not discuss congressional standing or equitable
discretion, either because the presence of so many private plain-
tiffs with standing made those inquiries superfluous,62 or because
the opinion was expedited in order to meet a statutory deadline.6
The court dismissed the first claim under the political-question
doctrine.6 4 It noted that the power to determine congressional
rules of proceedings is textually committed to the legislative
branch and that no exception should be made in this case in which
only congressmen's rights were jeopardized.6 5 In any case, "pru-
dential considerations" counselled against the court's showing a
lack of respect to the legislative branch by adjudging Congress's
interpretation of its own rules. 6 The court found that the fifth
amendment claims were not ripe for decision, because they boiled
down to "claims that the statute is capable of unconstitutional ap-
plication.167 Finally, the court proceeded to the merits of the third
claim and decided that the FERC order was a "nondiscretionary
act[] required by" the statute68 and therefore was exempted from
notice and comment requirements by Section 553(b)(B) of the
60. Metzenbaum, 675 F.2d at 1284.
61. Id.
62. Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (noting that it was unnecessary
to reach the issue of the congressmen's standing, because individual, private plaintiffs
clearly had standing).
63. See Metzenbaum, 675 F.2d at 1286.
64. Id. at 1287.
65. Metzenbaum, 675 F.2d at 1287.
66. Id. at 1287-88. But cf. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1173 n.16, 1174-
75 (D.C. Cir, 1982) (relying on the same "prudential considerations" in the name of equi-
table discretion that the Metzenbaum court relied on in the name of political question.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
67. Id. at 1289 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 1291.
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APA. 9
In Pierce, Housing and Urban Development (HUD) employ-
ees, their union and Congressman Martin Sabo, a member of the
House Appropriations Committee, sued the Secretary of HUD.
They claimed that the Secretary's proposed reduction-in-force vio-
lated a provision of the HUD Appropriation Act prohibiting the
use of any funds "to plan, design, implement or administer any
reorganization . . . without the prior approval of the Committees
on Appropriations. ' 70 The D.C. Circuit expressly "pretermit[ted]
the question whether the district court was the appropriate forum
for the employees' complaint."' 71 It did decide, however, two issues
of legislator standing. Relying on Harrington v. Bush,72 the court
decided that Congressman Sabo did not have standing to sue as a
member of the House, because his interest as a legislator in the
proper execution of the laws was no different from that of any
citizen and was therefore too "generalized."7 3 Relying, however,
on Kennedy v. Sampson,7 4 and analogizing the situation to Gold-
water v. Carter,75 the D.C. Circuit Court decided that the con-
gressman did have standing as a member of the House Appropria-
tions Committee, because "[t]he Secretary's actions injured him
by depriving him of that specific statutory right to participate in
the legislative process . . . unique to members of the Appropria-
tions Committees. 76 Proceeding to the merits, the court found the
approval clause unconstitutional, struck down the legislative provi-
sion in its entirety and lifted the district court's injunction on the
reduction-in-force. 77 The court did not mention the equitable-dis-
69. See Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 675 F.2d 1282,
1291 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(B) (1988)).
70. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 304 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (per curiam) (quoting Department of Housing and Urban Development - Indepen-
dent Agencies Appropriation Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-272, 96 Stat. 1160, 1164 (1982)
(codified at 36 U.S.C. §§ 121b-122a (1988))).
71. Pierce, 697 F.2d at 304.
72. 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (denying a congressman standing to challenge
CIA activities for exceeding the Agency's statutory authority and CIA use of funding and
reporting provisions for impairing his interests as a legislator).
73. Pierce, 697 F.2d at 305.
74. 511 F.2d 430, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (granting a senator standing to challenge an
allegedly illegal pocket veto, which "nullified" his vote on the specific bill at issue).
75. 617 F.2d 697, 702-03 (D.C. Cir.) (granting senators standing to challenge the
President's termination of a treaty without seeking their advice and consent, since termina-
tion nullified their opportunity to vote), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
76. Pierce, 697 F.2d at 305 (footnote omitted).
77. Id. at 305-08.
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cretion doctrine. Moreover, it based its standing analysis on cases
that the Riegle court described as inconsistent." The unsatisfac-
tory rationale of Pierce may be explained, however, by the fact
that its opinion was expedited. 79
The first case to rely on Riegle was Vander Jagt v. O'Neill.80
In that case, fourteen Republican Representatives brought various
constitutional claims against, among others, the Democratic lead-
ership of the House. Suing in various capacities, including as
members of the House and of their respective committees, as indi-
vidual voters and as representatives of all voters in districts repre-
sented by Republicans,"' they alleged that the Democrats had
given them fewer committee assignments than they were propor-
tionately owed. 2
Vander Jagt laid the groundwork for the D.C. Circuit's two
divergent views of congressional-plaintiff cases. The first view is
that of Judge Gordon, writing for the majority, who was con-
cerned that the court "not deny [its] jurisdiction" over claims of
unconstitutional legislative rule-making."3 In this way, the court
would not be hindered from intervening in the future when faced
with egregiously discriminatory rule-making, such as that which
had led other courts to censure legislatures for unconstitutionally
excluding or expelling a member.8 4 The majority was also con-
vinced that separation-of-powers issues do not belong in the stand-
ing inquiry. 5 Judge Gordon, rejecting any distinction for standing
purposes between the nullification of a legislator's vote and the
diminution in a legislator's influence (The Goldwater standard 6 ),
78. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (Harrington, on the one hand,
inconsistent with Kennedy and Goldwater, on the other).
79. See Pierce at 309 (Wald and Mikva, JJ., statement advocating rehearing en
banc); Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 45 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., dissenting) (Judge
Bork explaining his prior inconsistent stance in Pierce as due, in part, to "the emergency
nature of [that] appeal."), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361
(1987).
80. 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
81. Id. at 1167 n.l.
82. Id. at 1167.
83. Id. at 1170.
84. Id. (citing cases).
85. Id. at 1169. But see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) ("[T]he law of
Article Ill standing is built on a single basic idea - the idea of separation of powers.");
Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 51-52 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., dissenting) (declaring the
position untenable, after Allen, that separation-of-powers considerations do not belong in
the standing inquiry), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
86. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on other grounds,
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because of Riegle,87 found the standing requirement satisfied by
the plaintiffs' allegations of dilution of their political power as leg-
islators and as voters.88 The majority also rejected a political-
question solution, because it doubted "the intelligibility of the
'textually committed' aspect of the . . . doctrine."8 9 Instead, the
court exercised its "remedial discretion" to dismiss the congress-
men's suit."0
The Vander Jagt court did more, however, than just change
the name of the doctrine from "equitable" to "remedial" discre-
tion." In a footnote, it apparently substituted for Riegle's two-
part test a standard of "broad discretion" bounded only by "rea-
sonableness."" 2 Because the plaintiffs sued both as legislators and
as private citizens,93 the court concluded that the simple Riegle
analysis did not apply.94 The majority did not state that the plain-
tiffs' claims as private citizens were not properly before them. It
hardly mentioned the availability of an in-house remedy, while ad-
mitting that the presence of a private claim "strengthened the[]
argument for judicial review."9 Instead, the court justified the ex-
ercise of its discretion to dismiss all the claims before it with the
bare conclusion that it would be "disastrously intrusive" and
"startlingly unattractive" for the court to tell Congress how to
make committee assignments.98
Judge Bork's concurrence97 contrasts sharply with the major-
ity's approach and represents the second view of congression-
plaintiff cases. Judge Bork saw the separation-of-powers' concerns
444 U.S. 996 (1979); see supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
87. See Riegle, 656 F.2d at 880 (questioning the Goldwater distinction because even
in that case, which granted standing, "collegial remedies existed"); Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d
at 1168 (stating that Riegle "discarded" the distinction).
88. Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1168.
89. Id. at 1173.
90. Id. at 1175-77.
91. See id. at 1175 n.25 ("Our shift from the phrase 'equitable discretion' to 'reme-
dial discretion' indicates only that our appellants sought both injunctive and declaratory
relief, unlike Riegle's.").
92. Id. at 1175 n.24.
93. See id. at 1169 n.4.
94. Id. at 1175 n.24.
95. Id. at 1169 n.4.
96. Id. at 1176. It would appear that, by dismissing all of the claims under equitable
discretion, the court was extending the applicability of the doctrine beyond congressional-
plaintiffs to private plaintiffs as well. But see Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 546 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (rejecting the argument that Vander Jagt compels such an extension); infra text
accompanying notes 155-61.
97. Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1176-85 (Bork, J., concurring).
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implicated by congressional-plaintiff suits as a jurisdictional mat-
ter, prohibiting the court from acting, rather than a matter of ju-
dicial discretion to assure "that non-frivolous claims of unconstitu-
tional action would [not] go unreviewed by a court."98 He
questioned Riegle's premise that the Supreme Court believed that
separation-of-powers issues do not belong in the standing inquiry
and argued that this position was even more clearly untenable in
light of language in the Supreme Court's decision in Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc.9" Judge Bork called for a return to the standard
established in Goldwater v. Carter, which would deny standing to
legislators unless they could show a "nullification" of their vote. 00
He felt that anything less would not rise to the level of injury in
fact.' 0 '
By the time the next congressional-plaintiff case reached the
D.C. Circuit, two members of the panel that heard it apparently
had come to a solid understanding of the equitable-discretion doc-
trine. As a result, the doctrine was invoked in Crockett v. Rea-
gan'02 with little explanation and no attempt to respond to the
difficulties raised by Vander Jagt. In Crockett, twenty-nine con-
gressmen sued the President, claiming that the United States
presence in and military aid to El Salvador violated the war pow-
ers clause, the War Powers Resolution and the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 ("FAA").10 3 Without analysis, the circuit court af-
98. Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 882 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981), quoted in Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1183 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
99. 454 U.S. 464 (1982), discussed in Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1179-81 (Bork, J.,
concurring).
100. 617 F.2d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979),
discussed in Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1180-81 (Bork, J., concurring).
101. Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1180-81 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork later re-
jected the notion of congressional standing altogether, even for legislators who allege a
"nullification" of their vote. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 68 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., dissenting), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987);
infra text accompanying note 143. For a discussion of Judge Bork's views about standing,
see generally Polsby, Analysis of Judge Robert H. Bork's Opinions on Standing, 9 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 175 (1987) (Judge Bork's opinion on the issue of standing is rooted in juris-
dictional limits rather than discretionary limits on judicial authority).
102. 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251
(1984).
103. Id. at 1356. The FAA prohibits "security assistance . . . to any country the
government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of . . .human
rights," in the absence of presidential certification of "extraordinary circumstances." 22
U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1988).
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firmed the district court's dismissal of the war-powers claims
under the political-question doctrine and the FAA claim under the
equitable-discretion doctrine.10 4 The difference between the two
doctrines was not explained and is difficult to discern. This diffi-
culty arises because, on the one hand, the court defined equitable
discretion as a doctrine "which counsels judicial restraint where a
congressional plaintiff's dispute is primarily with his or her fellow
legislators."'1 05 On the other hand, it apparently derived its conclu-
sion that the war-powers issue was a political question from the
district court's finding "that Congress had taken no action which
would suggest that it viewed our involvement in El Salvador as
subject to the [War Powers Resolution]. "6 In other words, the
court was unwilling to hear either the war-powers or the FAA
claims because it thought the plaintiffs could in each case seek
relief from their colleagues. The Crockett court did not address
the question, raised by Riegle, of the likelihood that a private
plaintiff would have standing to bring this claim. Judge Bork con-
curred in the result for essentially the same reasons that he did in
Vander Jagt.10 7
In Moore v. United States House of Representatives,"8 the
court reintroduced into the injury-in-fact part of the standing in-
quiry the distinction between the nullification of a legislator's vote
and the diminution in the effectiveness of his role.'09 The Moore
court held that a congressional plaintiff's injury was cognizable
when he alleged that executive or legislative action had deprived
him of a constitutionally protected interest in the process of enact-
ing law; it distinguished "a generalized complaint that a legisla-
tor's effectiveness is diminished by . . . activities taking place
outside the legislative forum." 10 In support of this proposition,
104. Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356-57, affig 558 F. Supp (D.D.C. 1982).
105. Id. at 1357 (citing Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981)) (The district court noted that because
Congress had enacted the necessary appropriations and accepted the President's certifica-
tions, judicial resolution of the dispute would permit the plaintiffs to circumvent democratic
processes. See Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 902-03.).
106. Crockett, 7.20 F.2d at 1356-57 (citing Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 899).
107. See Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1357 (Bork, J., concurring).
108. 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
109. Moore, 733 F.2d at 951-52. The distinction between nullification and diminish-
ment of voting power was rejected by the Vander Jagt majority on the authority of Riegle,
Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
823 (1983); see supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
110. Moore, 733 F.2d at 951.
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the court contrasted Kennedy (pocket veto) with Harrington (CIA
conduct) and Pierce (execution of a law)."' The court thereby
disregarded Riegle, which had adopted equitable discretion in part
because it found this standard unworkable and inconsistently ap-
plied in Kennedy and Harrington."2 The Moore plaintiffs satisfied
the standing test, because they alleged a specific injury to their
"rights to participate and vote on legislation in a manner defined
by the Constitution."'"13
In Moore, eighteen Representatives complained that the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) had been
passed in violation of the origination clause because, arguably, it
had originated in the Senate." 4 The court returned to the Riegle
guidelines and exercised its equitable discretion to dismiss the case
on the ground that the congressmen could get relief from their
colleagues in the form of the repeal of TEFRA."15 The court also
noted that private plaintiffs had been found to have standing to
challenge TEFRA under the origination clause." 6 Judge (now
Justice) Scalia concurred in the result, but disputed the majority's
premise that federal legislators have a private right to the exercise
of their official powers." 7 He conceded, however, that "[t]hey
have a private right to the office itself. . and to the emoluments
of the office . . . but the powers of the office belong to the people
and not to them.""' Judge Scalia felt that congressional plaintiffs
could not have standing to bring claims involving their "personal
desires ...to exercise their authority [because these were] not
within the 'zone of interests' protected by the provisions of the
Constitution and the laws conferring such authority . . . since the
authority was conferred for the benefit not of the governors but of
the governed." 1 9 He also expressed many of the same concerns
about the equitable-discretion doctrine that Judge Bork had ex-
111. Id. at 951-52.
112. See Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm. 656 F.2d 873, 656 F.2d at 879-81
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981); supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
113. Moore, 733 F.2d at 951.
114. Moore, 733 F.2d at 948-49 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 ("All Bills for
raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives .
115. Id. at 956.
116. Id. (citing Armstrong v. United States (S.D. Cal. 2 September 1983) (mem.);
Frent v. United States, 571 F.Supp. 739 (E.D. Mich. 1983); appeal dismissed, 734 F.2d 14
(6th Cir. 1984)).
117. Moore, 733 F.2d at at 959-60 (Scalia, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 959 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 960 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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pressed in his concurrences in Vander Jagt and Crockett.120
Moore's recognition of a distinction between hullifications
and diminutions in influence enabled the court in United Presbyte-
rian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan"2' to affirm for lack of stand-
ing a congressman's suit that the district court had dismissed
under the equitable-discretion doctrine.'22 In United Presbyterian,
various private organizations and individuals and one member of
Congress challenged an Executive Order concerning intelligence
activities. The court first dismissed the claims of the private plain-
tiffs under traditional standing analysis' 23 and then addressed the
question of congressional standing.2 4 Representative Ronald Del-
lums alleged his injury to be that the President, by violating statu-
tory limitations on intelligence activities, had diminished Del-
lums's power as a legislator.' 25 The court analogized this injury to
the injury alleged in Harrington, having noted that Moore had
cited Harrington as a case in which congressional standing was
justifiably denied.'26 Finding Representative Dellums's suit to be
"indistinguishable"' 27 from Representative Harrington's, who
"claimed that 'certain activities of the Central Intelligence Agency
were illegal, and that such unlawful conduct diminished his effec-
tiveness as a legislator,' 28 the court held that Representative Del-
lums did not allege a sufficient injury to achieve standing. Both
representatives had alleged a "generalized grievance" about gov-
ernmental conduct, rather than an injury specific to them as
legislatures.' 29
In only one case, Barnes v. Kline 30 have the proponents of
the two, divergent theories of congressional-plaintiff cases dis-
120. See id. at 961-65 (Scalia, J., concurring). On Judge Bork's concurrences, see
supra text accompanying notes 97-101 and 107.
121. 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
122. Id. at 1381-82, aff'g 557 F. Supp. 61 (D.D.C. 1982). It is not surprising that
the three-judge panel that decided United Presbyterian included both Judge Scalia and
Judge Bork.
123. United Presbyterian, 738 F.2d at 1378-81.
124. Id. at 1381-82.
125. Id. at 1381.
126. Id. at 1382; see supra text accompanying notes 108-13.
127. United Presbyterian, 738 F.2d at 1382.
128. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 951 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985), quoted in United Presbyterian Church in the
U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
129. United Presbyterian, 738 F.2d at 1382.
130. 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479
U.S. 361 (1987).
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agreed on the result to be reached. This is explained by the fact
that Barnes is also the only post-Riegle case in which the congres-
sional plaintiffs have won on the merits.131
In Barnes, thirty-three representatives, joined by the Senate,
the Speaker of the House and the bipartisan leadership of the
House, challenged the constitutionality of a pocket veto attempted
at the end of a legislative session of Congress.3 2 The majority
found, on the authority of Kennedy v. Sampson, 33 that the indi-
vidual members as well as the Senate and leadership of the House
had standing.' 34 Without mentioning equitable discretion by
name, the court proceeded to the merits, where it decided in favor
of the plaintiffs. 3 5 The Supreme Court heard the case but dis-
missed it as moot, since the bill had by this time expired by its
own terms. 36
Judge McGowan, writing for the majority at the circuit-court
level, based his decision to reach the merits on various ideas of
separation of powers, couched in an assortment of doctrines. 37
Judge McGowan found that the equitable-discretion concern that
the court not intervene to aid legislators "in overturning the re-
sults of the legislative process"" 38 was not implicated, since this
dispute was "solely with the Executive Branch." 9 He argued
that a "constitutional impasse," which Justice Powell regarded in
Goldwater as a prerequisite to the ripeness of a dispute between
members of the legislative and executive branches, existed in this
131. Only two other post-Riegle, congressional-plaintiff cases, Metzenbaum v. Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 675 F.2d 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and American Federa-
tion of Government Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam), even
reached the merits, but in those cases the congressional plaintiffs lost. See supra text ac-
companying notes 58-79.
132. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 23.
133. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (concluding that a senator had standing to chal-
lenge an intrasession pocket veto, which nullified his original vote on the bill).
134. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 25-26. For a discussion of the view that standing was ap-
propriately granted in Barnes, see Note, Congressional Standing and the Constitutionality
of the Pocket Veto During Intersession Adjournments, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 151 (1986) [herein-
after Pocket Veto Note].
135. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 30-41.
136. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987).
137. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 28. But see Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 545 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (citing this passage as "confirm[ing] that the essential concern of the equitable dis-
cretion doctrine is that the court not interfere in matters which properly could, and should,
be decided by appeal to one's fellow legislators.") (emphasis added).
138. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 28.
139. Id.
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case.140 Finally, he noted that to decide this case involving a par-
ticular pocket veto and the "[d]eprivation of a constitutionally
mandated process of enacting law" would not be to issue an advi-
sory opinion. 4'
Judge Bork's long dissent urged the court "to renounce out-
right the whole notion of congressional standing." '142 He no longer
would confer standing even in situations meeting the Goldwater
"nullification" test. 43 He also denounced equitable discretion as a
"lawless doctrine.' 44
The court dismissed its next two congressional-plaintiff suits
under the standing and political-question doctrines, even though
the district court in each case had relied on the equitable-discre-
tion doctrine.' 45 In Southern Christian Leadership Conference v.
Kelley,146 the court denied Senator Jesse Helms standing to chal-
lenge a judgment sealing records of FBI surveillance of Martin
Luther King, Jr. The Senator claimed that the sealing deprived
him of information necessary to guide his vote on the designation
of King's birthday as a national holiday. 47 The court compared
this claim to that of Representative Harrington, who alleged a
right to information concerning CIA activities in order to guide
his participation in the appropriations process.' 48 The court fol-
lowed the Harrington decision in determining that any denial of
information had not "nullified" the Senator's vote and therefore
was not an injury sufficient to confer standing.' "9 The court also
pointed out that the Senator had legislative remedies open to
140. Id.
141. Id. (quoting Moore v. United States House of Representatives 733 F.2d 946,
951 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). On advisory opinions, see generally E. CHEMERINSKY. FEDERAL
JURISDICTION § 2.2 (1989) (arguing that the prohibition against advisory opinions lies at
the heart of Article Ill's limitation on federal jurisdiction); Frankfurter, A Note on Advi-
sory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002 (1924) (arguing that wise constitutional interpreta-
tion requires concrete facts).
142. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 41 (Bork, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 68 n.18 (Bork, J., dissenting) (rejecting the position he took on this point
in Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1180-82 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Bork, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983). See supra text accompanying note 100.)
144. Id. at 61 (Bork, J., dissenting).
145. This also occurred in United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738
F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (district court dismissed congressional-plaintiff claim under
equitable discretion; D.C. Circuit dismissed for lack of standing). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 121-29.
146. 747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
147. Id. at 779-80.
148. Id. at 780 (citing Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 202-04 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
149. Id.
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him,15° in essen6e resolving the equitable-discretion issue against
him. Nevertheless, the court said that it did not need to reach that
doctrine. 51 Then in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 52 the court re-
lied on the political-question doctrine, as applied in Crockett, 5 3 to
dismiss congressional-plaintiff claims that American activities in
Nicaragua violated the war powers clause.
54
The court was faced in Gregg v. Barrett155 with one of the
uncertainties about the application of the equitable-discretion doc-
trine that were raised by the outcome of Vander Jagt.5 6 In Van-
der Jagt, the court had dismissed all the claims under its equita-
ble discretion, 157  although the congressional-plaintiffs had
presented themselves in both official and private capacities.1 58
Gregg involved a claim by both congressional and private plaintiffs
that the Congressional Record does not accurately transcribe con-
gressional floor debates, in violation of their first amendment
rights.1 59 The defendants requested that the court apply its equita-
ble discretion to all of the plaintiffs in order to dismiss the entire
complaint, but the court refused. The court applied the equitable-
discretion doctrine only to the congressional plaintiffs, who could
obtain relief through the legislative process, 6 0 while it dismissed
the complaint as to the private plaintiffs for failure to state a
cause of action.' 6'
Two new aspects of equitable discretion have emerged in the
two most recent congressional-plaintiff cases that discuss the is-
150. Id.
151. Id. at 781 n.3.
152. 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
153. Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1251 (1984); see supra text accompanying notes 102-07.
154. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 210. Other plaintiffs and other claims were also
before the court. These were: twelve Nicaraguan citizens (nine of them also Nicaraguan
residents), bringing tort, fourth and fifth amendment claims; and two Florida residents
suing to enjoin as a nuisance the maintenance of paramilitary camps near their homes. All
were dismissed on other grounds. Id. at 206-10.
155. 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
156. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
823 (1983).
157. Id. at 1177.
158. Id. at 1167 n.l, 1168; see also id. at 1183-84 (Bork, J., concurring) (criticizing
the majority for glossing over the public/private distinction). See supra text accompanying
notes 93-96.
159. Gregg, 771 F.2d at 540.
160. Id. at 543-46.
161. Id. at 546-49.
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sues in any detail. 62 First, the court has now expressly disap-
proved Riegle's suggestion that a court ought to reach the merits
of congressmen's suits. whenever "a private plaintiff would likely
not qualify for standing.' 16  Second, the majority opinions have
begun to express doubts about the viability of the doctrine itself.
In 1987, Senator John Melcher brought the same claim against
the FOMC that Senator Riegle had.' 4 He argued that because an
intervening case had held that private plaintiffs do not have stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of the selection of the Re-
serve Bank members of the FOMC, the court would have to hear
his suit.'65 The D.C. Circuit disagreed. It dismissed as "dicta" the
relevant language in Riegle, 66 pointed out that this part of the
Riegle test had never been "squarely" applied and indeed had
been questioned before, 61 and that the availability of private
plaintiffs was irrelevant to the separation-of-powers considerations
on which equitable discretion is founded. 68 The court agreed
nonetheless with the concurrence's "concern over whether the
court-fashioned doctrine of equitable discretion 'is a viable doc-
162. Melcher v. Federal Open Market Committee, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2034 (1988); Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 491 (1988).
The most recent congressional-plaintiff case to reach the D.C. Circuit does not address
the doctrine of equitable discretion and relegates to a single footnote all discussion of the
congressional plaintiffs. In Dellums v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 863
F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1988), seven members of Congress, four private organizations and two
private individuals petitioned for review of two Nuclear Regulatory Commission orders
which they claimed violated the ban on imports of South African products. The court re-
fused to confer standing on any of the plaintiffs. The court noted that "Members of Con-
gress do not have standing in cases like this where the Members have not alleged an injury
that is "specific and cognizable," arising out of an interest "positively identified by the
Constitution.."" Id. at 970 n.1 (quoting United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Rea-
gan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Moore v. United States House of
Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985))).
Another recent congressional-plaintiff case did not reach the D.C. Circuit. See Helms
v. Secretary of the Treasury, 721 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (D.D.C. 1989) (congressmen's chal-
lenge to the inclusion of Namibia as a target of anti-apartheid sanctions dismissed by the
district court under the equitable-discretion doctrine, because it is "the law of this jurisdic-
tion," although the court "[r]ecogniz[ed] that this doctrine has undergone some anomalous
applications, and that the viability of this court-fashioned doctrine has been questioned").
163. Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 882 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
165. Melcher, 836 F.2d at 562-63 (citing Committee for Monetary Reform v. Board
of Governors, 766 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
166. Id. at 563.
167. Id. at 564 (quoting Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 544) (D.C. Cir. 1985).
168. Id. at 564.
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trine upon which to determine the fate of constitutional
litigation.' 189
In 1988, in Humphrey v. Baker,70 the court approved the
Melcher court's rejection of the private-plaintiff part of the Riegle
test171 and reiterated its "concern" about the whole doctrine.1 72
The court nonetheless used its equitable discretion to dismiss the
attempt by Senator Gordon Humphrey and some of his colleagues
in the House to challenge the constitutionality of the Federal Sal-
ary Act of 1967.'1' The court added, however, that even if it were
not bound to apply equitable discretion here, these congressmen
would lose on the merits. 74
II. SOMETHING OLD OR SOMETHING NEW?
This survey of the cases reveals that the equitable-discretion
doctrine has had kinks since its very inception and that the
problems surrounding congressional-plaintiff suits today are as
knotty as ever, if not more so. In implementing equitable discre-
tion, the Riegle court added two new elements to the court's ap-
proach to congressional plaintiffs: it suggested that the availability
of private plaintiffs could justify the court's decision to throw con-
gressmen out of court, and it made the question of whether to
hear their suits one of judicial discretion rather than jurisdictional
power.'75 Riegle, however, neither changed the court's analytical
approach to congressional plaintiffs nor encouraged it to reach the
merits of their cases.
Because the private-plaintiff part of the equitable-discretion
test never took hold, 176 the basis for reaching the merits remains
the same as it was before Riegle: the court still asks whether the
complaining legislator could get relief in Congress. This test is no
less problematic to apply under the new guise than it was under
the old. The Barnes court considered as a threshold matter, just as
the Kennedy court had, whether the plaintiffs could get redress
from their colleagues concerning a challenged pocket veto. 177 Ken-
169. Id. at 565 n.4 (quoting id. at 565 (Edwards, J., concurring)).
170. 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
171. Id. at 213 n.3, 214.
172. Id. at 214.
173. Id. at 214-15.
174. Id. at 215-17.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 48-57.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 162-74.
177. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub
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nedy considered the issue in the context of the standing inquiry, 178
while Barnes considered it in the course of a post-standing analy-
sis.' 7 Both courts decided that the true dispute was with the Ex-
ecutive, and both proceeded to the merits, where they granted
judgment to the congressional plaintiffs. The Riegle court was un-
easy with characterizing Kennedy as a case in which a collegial
remedy was unavailable.1 0 It is difficult to believe that the Riegle
court would have been any less uneasy about Barnes. For in both
Kennedy and Barnes, the plaintiffs could have ,attempted to re-
enact the pocket-vetoed legislation.
Although Barnes raises the suspicion that equitable discretion
is merely a new name for the old approach to congressional-plain-
tiff suits, the removal of the problem from jurisdictional analysis
appears to be a significant change. Indeed, the Vander Jagt court
thought it was "critical" for the court to hang on to jurisdiction,
at least over suits involving a congressman's challenge to the as-
signment of committee seats." 1 , In this way, the court's hands
would not be tied when faced with the most egregious examples of
congressional manipulation of the committee system.'8 2 To illus-
trate situations in which the court might need to intervene, the
majority cited earlier cases in which the Supreme Court and one
federal district court had decided the merits of a state or local
legislator's claim that he had been unfairly excluded or expelled
from his elected office.183
Others on the circuit have found more objective distinctions
between the cases cited by the Vander Jagt majority and the cases
in which they have thought jurisdiction was unavailable. They
have pointed out that in the former cases, in which jurisdiction
was conferred, the injury was a nullification of a legislator's vote,
rather than the mere diminution in his influence;' the complaint
nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435 n.17
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
178. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 137-41.
180. Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
181. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 823 (1983).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1170-71.
184. See id. at 1184-85 n.4 (Bork, J., concurring). Later, Judge Bork reached the
conclusion that not even "nullifications" of a legislator's vote should satisfy the injury-in-
fact analysis. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 68 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissent-
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alleged the "right to the office itself' or to its emoluments, rather
than to its powers; 185 and the plaintiff was a state or local legisla-
tor rather than a federal one.' 86 Whether these are compelling dis-
tinctions or not, it is clear that the Vander Jagt majority also dis-
tinguished the cases they cited. After all, those cases were decided
on the merits, while Congressman Vander Jagt's claim was not.
Unfortunately, the majority's equitable-discretion test of whether
the plaintiff's dispute was primarily with his fellow-legislators fails
to distinguish between the earlier cases decided on the merits and
the later ones dismissed under equitable discretion, since in all of
them the legislator's complaint derived from his having been out-
voted by his colleagues.
Two conclusions follow. On the one hand, the failure of "the
availability of an in-house remedy" test to distinguish the cases in
which judicial intervention is appropriate from those in which it is
not suggests that the adoption of equitable discretion was unneces-
sary and ineffectual. On the other hand, the post-Riegle court's
record of dismissals shows that the opposition camp's prophecies
about the dire results of severing this standard from the jurisdic-
tional inquiry have not been fulfilled.
Judge Bork argued in his Barnes dissent that recognizing ju-
risdiction in congressional-plaintiff cases constitutes a dangerous
aggrandizement of judicial power.' 81 He reasofied that unless the
court denied jurisdiction to hear suits brought by congressmen
over alleged injuries to their official powers, it might soon be
asked to intervene in every sort of governmental dispute imagin-
able, brought by members of all branches of both state and the
federal governments. Decisions like Barnes threatened to "so en-
hance the power of the courts as to make them the dominant
branch of government."'8 8 What Judge Bork's parade of horribles
ignores is that conferring standing, admitting ripeness, denying
mootness and refusing to recognize a question as political do not
guarantee judicial intervention when a congressional plaintiff is in-
ing), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); supra text accom-
panying note 143.
185. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 .2d 946, 959 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Scalia, J., concurring), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); see Barnes, 759 F.2d at
50 (Bork, J., dissenting) (quoting Moore, 733 F.2d at 959); supra text accompanying note
118.
186. Moore, 733 F.2d at 959 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring).
187. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 42 (Bork, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 44 (Bork, J., dissenting).
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volved. Even if judges and executive-branch officials began flock-
ing to the courts in great numbers to complain of injuries to the
exercise of their official powers, the court would undoubtedly show
the same reluctance to intervene as it has when legislators have
enlisted its aid. Significantly, since the adoption of equitable dis-
cretion, the D.C. Circuit has granted relief in only one congres-
sional-plaintiff case: Barnes.-1 9 *
Although equitable discretion has not changed the analytical
framework within which the court resolves congressional-plaintiff
cases, and although the non-jurisdictional approach has not en-
hanced the control of the judiciary over the democratic process,
the adoption of the new doctrine has created at least one addi-
tional cost. That cost is the D.C. District Court's confusion over
which doctrine to apply to dismiss congressional-plaintiff claims.
From Riegle onward, the D.C. Circuit has used the equitable-dis-
cretion doctrine to dismiss seven congressional claims; 190 it has de-
nied, standing in three; 9' it has dismissed another three as politi-
cal questions,"' one as unripe,193 and it has reached the merits of
three. 94 Often, the court has applied more than one doctrine
within the same case. 9 5 In seven of the eleven congressional-plain-
tiff cases heard by the district court since Riegle, the D.C. Circuit
has affirmed the lower court's holding, but has relied on a differ-
ent doctrine from that relied on by the district court. 96 Never has
189. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
190. See Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 491
(1988); Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 2034 (1988); Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Moore v.
United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1106 (1985); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1251 (1984); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 823 (1983); Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
191. See Dellums v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 863 F.2d 968 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (per curiam); United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
192. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Crockett, 720
F.2d at 1355; Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 675 F.2d 1282 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
193. See Metzenbaum, 675 F.2d 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
194. See Barnes, 759 F.2d at 21; American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697
F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Metzenbaum, 675 F.2d 1282.
195. Notably in Crockett, for example. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
196. See Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 491
(1988); Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. de-
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the appellate court clearly explained the differences it sees be-
tween the several doctrines in an effort to guide the lower court.
III. THE CASE FOR STANDING
The persistence of the standing and political-question doc-
trines, and to a lesser extent ripeness and mootness, as means of
dismissing congressional-plaintiff suits even after Riegle derives
from the very limited usefulness of equitable discretion's "availa-
bility of an in-house remedy" test. The test requires the court to
determine who the real defendant is: if the real defendant is some-
one within the legislative branch, then the court can apply equita-
ble discretion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
plaintiff's colleagues can right the wrong; if the defendant is a
member of the executive branch, then the court must look to other
doctrines for a way to avoid deciding the case. Thus, the court
only uses equitable discretion to dismiss congressmen's challenges
to in-house rule-making, as in Vander Jagt, and to legislation, as
in Moore and in Riegle. Of all such challenges, only Metzenbaum
was not dismissed under the equitable-discretion doctrine. That
case may be explained by two facts: that its opinion was expedited
to meet a statutory deadline and that many of its plaintiffs were
non-congressional plaintiffs. 197 When congressmen have chal-
lenged executive or judicial action, the court has never invoked
equitable discretion. It has either dismissed the claim under one of
the traditional doctrines, such as standing in United Presbyterian
and political question in Sanchez, or it has decided the issue on
the merits, as it did in Barnes and Pierce.
This difference in treatment of challenges to legislative-
branch action as contrasted with executive-branch action explains
the peculiar juxtaposition of two different doctrines in Crockett.98
The court in that case approved the District Court's dismissal of
two challenges to the United States involvement in El Salvador: it
approved the dismissal of the war-powers claim under the politi-
cal-question doctrine and the FAA claim under the equitable-dis-
nied, 108 S.Ct. 2034 (1988); Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Southern
Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam);
United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
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cretion doctrine. The bifurcated analysis is consistent with the
D.C. Circuit's different approaches to inter- and intra-branch dis-
putes. The District Court saw the war-powers claim as raising the
question of whether the Executive was exceeding its constitutional
authority. It saw the FAA claim as alleging that Congress had not
adhered to its own requirements in approving aid to El Salva-
dor.1"9 One might doubt, however, that there is much to distin-
guish the claims, given that both courts also thought it significant
that Congress as a whole had taken no action to assert a war-
powers violation.2 °0 One might view the war-powers claim, there-
fore, as a dispute primarily between the plaintiffs and their inac-
tive colleagues, rather than between the plaintiffs and the execu-
tive branch. Viewed in this light, the war-powers claim
appropriately would have been dismissed under equitable discre-
tion. The court, however, has consistently treated claims that
could be characterized as congressional failure to censure execu-
tive action differently from claims that Congress has acted
illegally.
The Riegle court argued that the existing doctrines of stand-
ing, political question and ripeness were ill-suited to "articulating
[its] prudential concerns in congressional plaintiff [sic] cases."2 1
While the court's explanation of the inadequacies of each of the
three doctrines was weak,202 its exasperation with them is none-
theless understandable. Judicial and academic criticism of the Su-
preme Court's standing and political-question decisions has been
considerable. 0 3 Only one Justice on the Supreme Court has advo-
cated ripeness as a doctrine of broad usefulness in dealing with
congressional-plaintiff cases. Still, given the very limited appli-
199. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 902 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355
(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
200. Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356-57; Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 899.
201. Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 37-47.
203. For criticism of the standing doctrine, see Dellums v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 863 F.2d 968, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[T]he guidance discernible
from decisions of the Supreme Court on standing is less then pellucid."); McGowan, supra
note 19, at 252-56; Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 635 (1985); Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68 n.3 (1984). For
criticism of the political question-doctrine, see, Henkin, Is There a "'Political Question'
Doctrine? 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question,"
79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1031 (1985). But see Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question
Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1988).
204. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-1002 (1979) (Powell, J., concur-
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cation of equitable discretion (to intra-congressional conflicts
alone), and the confusion it engenders, the argument is appealing
for eliminating the new doctrine of equitable discretion and dis-
missing congressional-plaintiff suits under one of the old doctrines.
The court, moreover, should not ignore the constitutionally based
limits on its power merely because it finds them difficult to
apply. 20 5
The political-question doctrine, if it survives at all, surely ap-
plies to intra-branch disputes. 206 The problem for a court that ac-
cepts this limited role for the political-question doctrine can be
framed as the determination of whether the congressional plain-
tiff's dispute is primarily with his fellow-legislators or with an-
other brarzh of government. If the former, the court could then
dismiss it as "political," with precisely the same effect as if it had
applied equitable discretion. The court could also follow Justice
Powell and dismiss the claim as unripe, since the equitable-discre-
tion "availability of an in-house remedy" test closely resembles his
test of whether Congress and the Executive have reached a "con-
stitutional impasse.1 207
Professor Henkin's insightful treatment of the political-ques-
tion cases suggests yet another way to do away with equitable dis-
cretion, at least as it has been applied in some cases. When the
court dismisses congressional-plaintiff challenges to legislative
rule-making, it may be holding, in effect, on the merits, that "the
act complained of fell within the enumerated powers conferred
upon the political branches by the Constitution . . . and . . . did
[not] violate any right reserved to the petitioner by the Constitu-
tion. '20 8 Rule-making is certainly one of Congress's enumerated
ring) ("The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power be-
tween the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional
impasse.").
205. On this point, see Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J.,
dissenting), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
206. See Wald, Life on the District of Columbia Circuit: Literally and Figuratively
Halfway Between the Capitol and the White House, 72 MINN. L. REV. I, 11 (1987)
("There have, of course, always been cases involving disputes within the other branches
that courts have declined to hear. . . . For example, our court refused to decide a suit by
Indiana Republicans seeking to compel the House of Representatives to seat their candi-
date . . . . We called it a classic political question .. ") (citing Morgan v. United
States, 801 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1359 (1987)).
207. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997. See supra text accompanying note 46.
208. Henkin, supra note 203, at 606 (referring to dismissals under the political ques-
tion doctrine).
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powers 2°9 and language in the Vander Jagt and Gregg cases also
supports the interpretation that those cases involved no constitu-
tional violation of any rights of the congressional plaintiffs'. The
Vander Jagt court said that its "decision today simply recognizes
that if Congress should adopt internal procedures which 'ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights,' it is clear
that we must provide remedial action. 210 Similarly, in Gregg,1 l
the dismissal of the suit as to the private plaintiffs for failure to
state a cause of action suggests that the suit could have been dis-
missed as to the congressional plaintiffs for the same reason.212
The question of what rights the Constitution reserves to congres-
sional plaintiffs is the crux of this approach.
In the final analysis, however, standing remains the most suit-
able doctrine for dismissing congressional-plaintiff cases. Because
in some cases the court is clearly refusing to decide difficult ques-
tions on the merits,213 Professor Henkin's theory does not have as
broad an application as the standing doctrine. 14 Moreover, Allen
v. Wright215 has dispelled the D.C. Circuit's doubt that standing
could address the separation-of-powers concerns inherent in con-
gressional-plaintiff suits.2 1 In Allen, the Supreme Court explicitly
209. See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 5, cl. 2.
210. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting United
States v. Bailin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983)). The VanderJagt
concurrence also seemed to look at the merits in concluding that standing did not exist. See
id., 699 F.2d at 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Bork, J., concurring) ("If providing a judicial
remedy in [a case like Kennedy or Goldwater] might have a degree of intrusiveness about
it, our concern should be lessened by the fact that the vote denied is a structual feature of
our government, clearly assumed in . . .the Constitution, as equal legislative influence or
committee membership is not."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
211. Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 159-61. Another case that leads one to sus-
pect that the court's view of the merits sometimes underlies its dismissal on equitable-
discretion grounds is Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Humphrey held
that even if the court were not bound to dismiss the congressional-plaintiff claim under
equitable discretion, the challenge to the Federal Salary Act failed on the merits.
Humphrey, 848 F.2d at 215. See supra text accompanying notes 173-74.
213. Consider, for example, the appointment clause issue in Riegle, see supra text
accompanying note 36, and the origination clause issue in Moore, see supra text accompa-
nying note 114.
214. See supra text accompanying note 208.
215. 468 U.S. 737, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984).
216. For the D.C. Circuit's doubts about the ability of standing to address separa-
tion-of-powers concerns, see Moore v. United States House of Rep., 733 F.2d 946, 954
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d
1166, 1169-70 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); Riegle v. Federal Open
Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 878 n.5 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981). The
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declared that the standing inquiry appropriately may address
those concerns.21l The D.C. Circuit, therefore, appropriately could
consider them under the "prudential" component of the standing
inquiry, rather than under equitable discretion. 18 Alternatively,
the D.C. Circuit could deny standing to congressional plaintiffs
under the injury-in-fact prong of the standing analysis.219 Justice
(then Judge) Scalia and Judge Bork have argued persuasively that
elected federal officials have no private right to the exercise of
their official powers, and therefore cannot gain standing when
they claim impairment of their governmental powers.220
D.C. Circuit reasoned in Vander Jagt that standing analysis could not incorporate separa-
tion-of-powers concerns for a number of reasons: the Supreme Court explicitly said so in
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1968); the Supreme Court vacated on grounds other
than standing the D.C. Circuit's decision of the merits of Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d
697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); and Supreme Court decisions since Flast
did not explicitly declare otherwise. See Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1169-70. But see id. at
1180 (Bork, J., concurring) ("The [Supreme Court's] Valley Forge decision, which came
after Riegle, demonstrates - conclusively, I believe - that the concept of standing contin-
ues to incorporate separation-of-powers considerations. The premise on which Riegle
rested, therefore, is no longer valid."); Moore, 733 F.2d at 957 (Scalia, J., concurring)
("[T]he Baker-Flast approach to standing has been repudicated by later Supreme Court
cases."); Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983).
217. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 97) ("[S]tanding is built on
a single basic idea - the idea of separation of powers. . . .[Q]uestions . . .relevant to the
standing inquiry must be answered by reference to the Art. II notion that federal courts
may exercise power . . . only when adjudication is 'consistent with a system of separated
powers ... ' "; see Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 51-52, 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J.,
dissenting), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). The Barnes
majority recognized that Allen put separation of powers squarely into the standing inquiry,
but refused to conclude that congressional plaintiffs never deserve standing. Barnes, 759
F.2d at 26-27; see id. at 28 n.14 (Allen "has nothing to do with 'governmental standing,'
nor does the Court mention the subject."). But see id. at 52 n.9 (Bork, J., dissenting)
(Allen compels the view that congressional plaintiffs have no judicially cognizable injury
when they allege impairment of their governmental powers.).
218. See Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1179 (Bork, J., concurring).
219. The standing inquiry contains a constitutional component, derived from the
"cases and controversies" requirement, U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, and a prudential
component. The constitutional component is usually said to contain three elements: (1)
injury in fact, (2) "fairly traceable" to the action of the defendant, and (3) "likely to be
redressed" by the requested relief. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-51; Valley Forge Chris-
tian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
471-72 (1982).
220. Judge Scalia argued that "a proper understanding of the doctrine of separation
of powers suggests that the personal desires of legislative and executive officers to exercise
their authority are not within the 'zone of interests' protected by the provisions of the
Constitution and laws conferring such authority." Moore v. United States House of Repre-
sentatives, 733 F.2d 946, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985). The requirement that a complaint fall within the zone
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In a similar vein, Professor Nichol has suggested that the
courts dismiss congressional-plaintiff cases "for lack of a judicially
cognizable interest. ' 221 He argues that congressmen have no per-
sonal interest in the exercise of their legislative powers. Moreover,
recognizing congressional standing inevitably would lead to recog-
nizing standing in other government officials, thereby "markedly
augment[ing] the scope of judicial authority. 222 Not only is
standing inappropriate, it is also unnecessary, because "Congress
...can protect its own interests. ' 223 Nichol's reluctance, how-
ever, to deny standing in a case in which Congress and the Presi-
dent have reached a "true impasse, ' '214 is misguided. When no pri-
vate plaintiff who has suffered a judicially cognizable injury is
before the court, then the issue is not suitable for judicial resolu-
tion.22 5 Courts, after all, exist to protect the rights of individu-
als226 and not merely to vindicate every illegal act.227 Moreover,
the D.C. Circuit's difficulty in satisfactorily defining "true im-
passes'228 may be due, in part, to judicial inability to determine
of interests protected by the relevant law is one of the prudential considerations of stand-
ing. Judge Bork, however, argued that congressional plaintiffs do not meet the injury-in-
fact requirement of standing, because impairment of governmental powers is not a judi-
cially cognizable injury. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 52 n.9 (Bork, J., dissenting).
221. Nichol, Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1915,
1944 (1986). For other views on congressional standing, see Dessem, Congressional Stand-
ing to Sue: Whose Vote Is This, Anyway?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1986); Note, The
Justiciability of Congressional-Plaintiff Suits, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 526 (1982); Congres-
sional Note, supra note 20; Note, The Burger Court s Unified Approach to Standing and
Its Impact on Congressional Plaintiffs, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187 (1985); Pocket Veto
Note, supra note 134; Comment, Standing Versus Justiciability: Recent Developments in
Participatory Suits Brought by Congressional Plaintiffs, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REv. 371 (1982).
222. Nichol, supra note 221, at 1945.
223. Id.; see Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41-71 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissent-
ing), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
224. Nichol, supra note 221, at 1945 n.164 (giving, as a hypothetical example of
such an impasse, the situation that would arise if Congress passed a resolution under the
War Powers Act challenging the legality of some military action taken by the President).
225. In many cases, a private plaintiff would eventually be able to assert a judicially
cognizable interest. See Barnes, 759 F.2d at 61 (Bork, J., dissenting). Such postponement
of judicial involvement could be beneficial, in that it would allow "time for the real impact
of laws and actions to become clear, thus making the constitutional inquiry less abstract
and more focused." Id. at 54 (Bork, J., dissenting).
226. See id. at 52 (Bork, J., dissenting); Scalia, supra note 216, at 884 (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)).
227. See Barnes, 759 F.2d at 60 (Bork, J., dissenting); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 754-55, (1984).
228. Compare Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981) (noting that a collegial remedy against a pocket veto
was available to the plaintiff senator in Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.
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when battles between the political branches have become so irrec-
oncilable as to justify third-branch interference.
IV. LACK OF PRINCIPLE
The fundamental problem with equitable discretion is not
that it is just a new name for an old method of analysis and does
not satisfactorily define when an in-house remedy should be
deemed "available",22 9 or that it threatens to enhance the court's
power2 30 or that it promotes confusion,231 or that it is not a cure-
all. 2  The fundamental problem with equitable discretion is that
it is "a lawless doctrine," 233 without basis "upon which to deter-
mine the fate of constitutional litigation. 234
Equitable discretion can be seen as a Bickellian "escape
route" or "device"2 35 for "deciding whether, when, and how much
to adjudicate. ' 238 Chief Judge McGowan proposed equitable dis-
cretion as a mechanism for allowing the court to abstain from
"impermissible judicial intrusion into the functions of a coordinate
1974), because he could "reintroduce the relevant legislation in the next session of Con-
gress and . . . vote thereon") with Barnes, 759 F.2d at 28 (claiming "[tihere could be no
clearer instance of 'a constitutional impasse,'" in another pocket-veto case in which Con-
gress had also not attempted to reintroduce the allegedly pocket-vetoed legislation).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 176-80.
230. The cases are still almost always dismissed. See supra text accompanying notes
187-89
231. See supra text accompanying notes 190-96.
232. See supra p. 1099.
233. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), va-
cated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
234. Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Edwards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 1042 (1988), quoted in Melcher, 836
F.2d at 565 n.4 (majority opinion), and Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211, 214 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 491 (1988).
235. "[E]scape route" was Professor Gunther's phrase. Gunther, The Subtle Vices
of the "Passive Vitues" - A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1964). "[D]evice" was Professor Bickel's phrase. Bickel, the Su-
preme Court 1960 Term - Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 42 (1961)
(This article was the basis of Bickel's subsequent book, A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH (2d ed. 1986)).
236. Bickel, supra note 235, at 79. Bickel and Gunther, supra note 235, were debat-
ing Supreme Court techniques for declining to decide cases, but their analyses appropri-
ately can be extended to equitable discretion, whose application prevents adjudication by
any Article Ill Court. See McGowan, supra note 19, at 252 n.4 (Gunther's comments are
more applicable to Article III courts other than the Supreme Court because those courts
lack the discretionary control over their dockets that the Supreme Court has by virtue of its
certiorari jurisdiction). For the view that all federal courts should be permitted to exercise
discretion in jurisdictional matters, so long as they do so openly and articulate their rea-
sons, see Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
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branch of government."2 7 He was particularly concerned that a
judgment in favor of a congressional plaintiff might "thwart[]
Congress's will by allowing a plaintiff to circumvent the processes
of democratic decision making."23 Nevertheless, the court has
also used equitable discretion so as not to "legitimate" congres-
sional actions by giving judgment on the merits to the defefidant
and thereby declaring the action "not unconstitutional."2 9
A major jurisprudential difficulty with treating equitable dis-
cretion as an appropriate "escape route" stems from the fact that
equitable discretion is divorced from jurisdictional considerations.
Professor Wechsler argued that the Marbury v. Madison rationale
for judicial review compels the view that the Court is powerless to
refuse to decide cases in which jurisdiction exists.240 Chief Justice
Marshall himself stated: "We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given." 24' Professor Bickel, on the other hand, argued that the
Supreme Court regularly does precisely that, and that it would be
dangerous if the Court did not. 42 If the Supreme Court heeded
"strict-constructionist compunctions" concerning its ability to de-
cline to perform judicial review, he argued, the result would be
either "rampant activism" or legitimation of legislation and exec-
utive action whenever the Court could not invalidate them accord-
ing to some "neutral principle. 243
Even if a court's discretion to decline review of certain cases
were not irreconcilable with the very notion of judicial review, a
237. McGowan, supra note 19, at 250.
238. Id. at 251; see Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
239. Bickel, supra note 235, at 48 (Bickel's thesis is that "legitimation" of a statute
or practice, i.e., upholding it on the merits, has far greater political consequences than
dismissal with the aid one of his "devices," because Supreme Court legitimation "can gen-
erate consent and may impart permanence" to a policy that was on its way out.). See the
discussion of Vander Jagt and Gregg, supra text accompanying notes 208-12.
240. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 6 (1959) (arguing that because the Constitution creates a judicial obligation "to say
what the law is," "there is no ... escape from the judicial obligation, Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)."), quoted in McGowan, supra note 19, at
252.
241. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821), quoted in Gunther,
supra note 235, at 19.
242. See Bickel, supra note 235, at 43-47.
243. Id. at 47-48 (referring to Professor Wechsler, whose thesis is that the courts
should not invalidate under the Constitution unless they can do so by "restling] on reasons
with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutral-
ity transcend any immediate result that is involved." Wechlser, supra note 240, at 19.).
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question remains as to whether the D.C. Circuit's doctrine of eq-
uitable discretion is "lawless" because it is not sufficiently princi-
pled. Professor Bickel thought that less-than-principled devices for
the avoidance of adjudication are a necessary ingredient of princi-
pled constitutional adjudication.244 Chief Judge McGowan, how-
ever, was determined that equitable discretion be so principled as
to satisfy even Professor Gunther.245 Professor Gunther's major
criticism of Professor Bickel was that the unprincipled use of
avoidance techniques is "a virulent variety of free-wheeling in-
terventionism" whose result was the compromising of the very
principles Professor Bickel sought to preserve.246 Professor Gun-
ther, therefore, would not flinch from "legitimating" legislation
and executive action when no appropriate avoidance technique,
such as a non-constitutional ground for decision, certiorari juris-
diction or a constitutionally based jurisdictional ground, is
available.247
Equitable discretion, despite Judge McGowan's protestations,
cannot survive a Guntherian critique. It is a judge-made doctrine,
not grounded in legislative or iri constitutional authority. The mal-
leability of the "availability of an in-house remedy" test248 means
that nothing contains this discretion. A court could all too easily
look first at the merits of a congressional plaintiff's claim and de-
cide whether a constitutional violation had occurred; if it thought
no violation had occurred, it could characterize the dispute as in-
house and dismiss under equitable discretion, as it did in
Humphrey 49 or, it could characterize the dispute as inter-branch
and dismiss under another doctrine, such as political question, as
it did with the war-powers claim in Crockett;2 50 if it thought a
violation had occurred, it could, as in Barnes, characterize the dis-
pute as inter-branch and invalidate on the merits.25' The D.C.
244. Bickel, supra note 235, at 50-51.
245. See McGowan, supra note 19, at 252.
246. Gunther, supra note 235, at 25.
247. See id.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 176-80.
249. See supra note 212 and text accompanying notes 208-12.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 198-200.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 177-80. Such wide discretion to decide
whether to hear congressional-plaintiff cases resembles the Supreme Court's certiorari ju-
risdiction, "which it took an act of Congress to create," Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 59
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479
U.S. 361 (1987), and which Bickel thought sometimes leads to denial of review for reasons
which "necessarily involve the merits." Bickel, supra note 235, at 52; see also Gunther,
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Circuit has allowed its "concern for non-interference in the legis-
lative process"2 52 to threaten its own -credibility.
CONCLUSION
Equitable discretion is not the solution to the problem of con-
gressional plaintiffs. Nor is reaching the merits of their claims.
The time has come for the D.C. Circuit to admit that it cannot
uphold the principle of not meddling in the legislative process
while at the same time clinging to jurisdiction to hear these suits.
Equitable discretion, is too unprincipled a means of deciding
whether to exercise that jurisdiction. The solution is for the courts
to deny congressmen standing, either on the ground that an injury
to official, governmental powers is not judicially.cognizable or be-
cause of prudential concerns about becoming an arm of the legis-
lative branch. Neither individual congressmen nor even both
houses of Congress acting' together should be able to enlist the
courts' aid in disputes with ,their own colleagues or with members
of the executive branch. Congress and congressmen will have to be
left to fight their own battles.
SOPHIA C. GOODMAN
supra note 235, at 13-14 (criticizing Bickel for advocating a merit-conscious approach to
certiorari).
252. Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
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